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CERCLA'S PETROLEUM EXCLUSION: BAD
POLICY IN A PROBLEMATIC STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) is a problematic and poorly drafted
statute that contains substantial ambiguity.2 This ambiguity has led to
significant confusion in the courts and to great disparity in the statute's
interpretation in several legal practice areas, including bankruptcy, cor-
porate law, and real estate.3 Judicial interpretation of CERCLA has
been stymied due to the dearth of legislative history.4 Resulting, no
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. See, e.g., Brent Nicholson & Todd Zuiderhoek, Lender Liability Dilemma: Fleet Fac-
tors History and Aftermath, 38 S.D. L. REV. 22, 28 (1993) ("Unfortunately, because of the
statutory ambiguity and less than complete legislative history, the courts have been forced to
clarify these issues and thus define the scope of lender liability."); Stanley M. Spracker &
James D. Barette, Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 527, 551
("Out of CERCLA's ambiguity, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has presented lenders
with a significant challenge."); Paul W. Heiring, Note, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under
CERCLA, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1141 (1985) ("The statutory language is ambiguous, and
CERCLA's legislative history provides little guidance.").
3. See, e.g., Brian 0. Dolan, Comment, Misconceptions of Contractual Indemnification
Against CERCLA Liability: Judicial Abrogation of the Freedom to Contract, 42 CATH. U. L.
REV. 179, 212 (1992) ("The ambiguity in some sections of CERCLA requires courts to look at
CERCLA's legislative history for guidance in interpreting the statute. Since 1990, some fed-
eral courts have overcompensated[,] . . .interpreting it to invalidate indemnity agreements
.... "); Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, Note, To Lend or Not to Lend-That Should
Not Be the Question: The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 41 DUKE L.J.
1211, 1211 (1992) ("Much of the lenders' uncertainty and confusion arises from the various
and often conflicting interpretations of CERCLA's secured creditor exemption .. "); Melissa
A. McGonigal, Comment, Extended Liability Under CERCLA: Easement Holders and the
Scope of Control, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 992, 1012 (1993) ("[A]mbiguity exists as to how far
CERCLA liability may extend into the corporate realm and beyond the corporate entity.");
Elizabeth A. Wolford, Note, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Interpreting the Security Inter-
est Exemption Using Common-Law Principles of Lender Liability, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1161, 1189 (1992) ("Only two circuit courts have considered the issue of whether a secured
creditor's activities fall within the scope of the security interest exemption .... [Bankruptcy
court] decisions reflected various interpretations of the [issue].").
4. See, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion"of Tradi-
tional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259, 262 (1992); Lisa Cope, Comment,
Who Should Pay Cleanup Costs-The Federal Response to Corporate Successor Liability Under
CERCLA, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 545-46, 550 (1992) (stating that because of CER-
CLA's hasty conception, Congress failed to address important issues and that courts have
filled in missing pieces).
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doubt, from the last minute nature of the statute's enactment, 5 the lack of
legislative history has forced the courts to guess at Congress's intent or to
rely on the anything but "plain language" of the statute.' The conse-
quence is inconsistent holdings in different federal circuits in cases in-
volving similar issues. Congress has attempted to strengthen the statute
in the decade since its passage,' but has done little to aid the judiciary in
the areas where problems most frequently arise.
Recently, a puzzling provision in CERCLA known as the petroleum
exclusion has been the subject of significant interpretational problems.
As with other elements of the statute, litigation over the petroleum exclu-
sion is now beginning to create a new body of federal statutory
construction.
Section 101(14) of CERCLA lists the hazardous substances that are
covered under the statute. Included on the list are benzene, toluene, xy-
lene, and ethylbenzene,9 each of which is an element of petroleum; inex-
plicably, however, the last clause of this section excludes crude oil and
petroleum.' 0 Thus, hazardous chemicals that would otherwise fall under
the ambit of CERCLA are immune from the statute when combined as
petroleum or crude oil. Recent litigation has focused on the scope of the
petroleum exclusion. Significantly, there is virtually no legislative history
regarding the petroleum exclusion," so it has been left to the courts to
determine its breadth.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of CERCLA's legis-
lative history, including the underlying environmental events that
prompted the statute's enactment. The legislative record is devoid of a
specific discussion of the petroleum exclusion, although some inferences
can be made from the legislative hearings and the competing environ-
5. See Cope, supra note 4, at 545 n.46.
6. See Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 803-04 (9th
Cir. 1989); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. California, 790 F. Supp. 983, 984 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
7. See Comment, Development in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv.
1458, 1513 (1986). Compare United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838
(4th Cir. 1992) (adopting "substantial continuity test" for corporate successor liability) with
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting "substantial
continuity" test for corporate successor liability).
8. Congress made changes regarding settlements, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 122, 100 Stat. 1613, 1678 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 9507 (1988) and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); placed a stronger
emphasis on enforcement against responsible parties, id. §§ 107-109, 100 Stat. at 1628, 1631,
1633; and increased the amount of funding for the program from $1.6 billion to $8.2 billion, id.
§ 9507, 100 Stat. at 1772.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988); see Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 803.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). For the text of the petroleum exclusion, see infra part IV.A.
11. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 805.
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mental legislation that preceded CERCLA. Part III provides an over-
view of the statute as adopted, and part IV examines the petroleum
exclusion, including judicial treatment and the legislative record. Part
IV develops several hypotheses for the possible motivations behind the
petroleum exclusion. Part V then suggests that the petroleum exclusion
is no longer justified and examines the way in which the exclusion frus-
trates the policy goals of CERCLA. This Comment argues that the pe-
troleum exclusion may act as a disincentive to the clean up of oil and
petroleum spills, resulting in serious public health threats.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA
A. Pre-CERCLA Environmental History
CERCLA may be viewed as the culmination of the environmental
law movement, which began gaining momentum in the late 1960s.12
This movement saw the passage of environmental statutes that included
the Clean Air Act,13 the Clean Water Act of 1977,14 and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 197615 (RCRA). These statutes deal
primarily with tangible pollution-readily observable environmental
events with effects that are quantifiable and solutions that are readily at
hand. That kind of tangible pollution was the dominating environmental
concern of that particular period.16 The concentration on reducing pol-
lutants in the air and water, however, led to a corresponding increase in
waste dumping on land.17 Landfills proliferated with attendant toxic
waste migration and leaks into subsoils18 and aquifers.' 9 Scientists un-
derestimated the problems that would result from land-based waste dis-
12. See David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection: Setting a National Goal for
State and Federal Programs, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 387, 389-90 (1989).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
14. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993)).
16. See Getches, supra note 12, at 388-89. "One three-day episode of industrial air pollu-
tion at Donora, Pennsylvania made 5,910 people ill and accounted for 20 deaths. Barry Com-
moner warned that the Great Lakes were dying and the Cuyahoga River, laden with volatile
chemicals, burst into flames." Id. (citations omitted).
17. See BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1991).
18. Subsoil is "the stratum of weathered material that underlies the surface soil." WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2279 (1976) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
19. An aquifer is a groundwater reservoir, "a bed or stratum of permeable rock, sand, or
gravel that yields water to wells or springs." Pamela King, Note, The Protection of Ground-
water and Public Drinking Supplies: Recent Trends in Litigation and Legislation, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1649, 1654 n.37 (1989).
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posal, as early theories relied too much on the power of the earth to
cleanse itself."
The reality of the burgeoning toxic waste problem exploded into the
public consciousness in 1978 with the discovery of a forgotten dump site
in Niagara Falls, New York, where buried chemicals were found leaking
into homes and seeping out of the ground.21 Popularly known as Love
Canal, this site became the force that would ultimately elevate the issue
of hidden toxic wastes to the forefront of the environmental reform
movement.22 In the six years prior to CERCLA's passage, the House of
Representatives attempted to pass a comprehensive environmental stat-
ute to deal with these developing problems of toxic waste.23 The Senate
also made similar attempts over a three-year period, leading to the adop-
tion of CERCLA.24 Underlying these legislative activities was the grow-
ing awareness of the seriousness of developing environmental problems.25
Faced with a perceived serious threat to public health, Congress de-
veloped a variety of environmental bills. Only four, however, became the
precursors to what would ultimately be CERCLA: House of Represent-
atives Bill 85, House of Representatives Bill 7020, Senate Bill 1341, and
Senate Bill 1480.26 None of these bills would survive intact; ultimately
20. See WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 4.
21. See Getches, supra note 12, at 391.
22. See Andrew Danzo, The Big Sleazy: Love Canal Ten Years Later, WASH. MONTHLY,
Sept. 1988, at 11; Tom Morganthau & Mary Hager, Coping with Toxic Waste, NEWSWEEK,
May 19, 1980, at 34.
23. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at xiii
(Helen C. Needham & Mark Menefee eds., 1982).
24. Id.
25. During congressional debates, Representative Weiss noted that
[The Surgeon General has stated:
".... We believe that toxic chemicals are adding to the disease burden of the
United States in a significant way."
A report issued just last month by the Library of Congress ... concluded that
enough toxic pollutants have been released to have affected every citizen in the Na-
tion. It is apparent that we are practically drowning in our own toxic wastes.
126 CONG. REC. 26,347 (1980) (statement of Rep. Weiss) (quotation marks added). Similarly,
during remarks to the House of Representatives prior to the introduction of H.R. 85, Repre-
sentative Biaggi called attention to a New York Times editorial that noted
[t]he highest price the world pays for its reliance on petroleum may turn out to be the
environmental damage caused by oil spills. A new record is almost certain to be set
this year for the amount of oil disgorged into the seas through spills, blowouts and
tanker collisions. And while the slick spreads, remedial legislation languishes in
Congress.
Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: Hearing on H.R. 85 Before the
Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1979) [hereinafter H.R. 85 Hearings].
26. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xiii.
1160
PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
the Stafford-Randolph Compromise 27 would replace them to become
CERCLA.
B. The Competing Bills
CERCLA was adopted on December 11, 1980.28 Each of the com-
peting bills that the House and Senate were working on in the months
prior to CERCLA's passage reflected the varying importance placed on
different toxins and environmental threats.2 9 A brief examination of each
competing bill will illustrate how the final statute evolved. It is particu-
larly interesting to note that although three of the four competing bills
included oil as a targeted substance, CERCLA established an exclusion
for oil.
1. House of Representatives Bill 85 (H.R. 85)
House of Representatives Bill 85 was known as the Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act,30 and Representative Biaggi introduced
it into the House on January 15, 1979. 11 The Bill was referred to the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which in turn referred
the Bill to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation.32 After
committee action, the Bill was reported to the full House of Representa-
tives on May 15, 1979.11 The reported version of the Bill was then re-
ferred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, which
later referred the Bill to the Committee on Ways and Means, which is-
sued a final version on June 20, 1980."4
The oil and chemical industries mounted significant opposition to
H.R. 85 because the Bill imposed liability for clean-up costs. 3 5 Among
the provisions was a $200 million trust fund--derived from oil and chem-
ical industry taxes-to pay for oil spill clean up and removal,36 as well as
damages to real or personal property, natural resources, loss of profits or
27. See infra part II.B.5.
28. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 35
(1982).
29. H.R. 85, for example, was primarily concerned with oil spills on navigable waters,
while the other House bill, H.R. 7020, was more comprehensive, focusing on oil as well as the
types of hazardous events typified by the disaster at Love Canal. See infra parts II.B.1-.2.
30. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
31. H.R. 85 Hearings, supra note 25, at 56-57.
32. See I ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xiii.
33. See id.
34. See id. at xiii-xiv; Grad, supra note 28, at 3.
35. See I ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xiv.
36. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1979).
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earnings due to destruction, and loss of tax revenues.a7 On August 27,
1980, Representative John Breaux proposed substitute provisions that al-
tered the original requirements so as to alleviate oil and chemical indus-
try opposition."a Ultimately, the House enacted the Breaux substitute
provisions on September 19, 1980.39 The Bill was later reported to the
Senate, which took no further action.4°
The final Bill established separate funds to provide for the clean up
of oil and hazardous substance spills on navigable waters.41 These funds
were to come from taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstocks.42 The
Bill also created strict joint and several liability,43 allowing plaintiffs to
collect all or part of their damages from any defendant, regardless of
degree of fault. This part of the statute created a deep-pockets source for
clean-up funding, an element that was ultimately incorporated into
CERCLA.44
2. House of Representatives Bill 7020 (H.R. 7020)
On April 2, 1980 Representative Florio introduced H.R. 7020,
which was called the Hazardous Waste Containment Act, into the House
of Representatives. 45 The Bill was referred to the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on the same day.46 The Committee re-
leased the revised version of the Bill on May 16, 1980 and referred it to
37. Id. § 103; Grad, supra note 28, at 3.
38. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xiv.
39. See 1 id.
40. See 1 id. at xv.
41. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101, 103 (1979).
42. Id. § 103.
43. Id. § 104.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The statute provides that covered persons-those sub-
ject to CERCLA liability-are
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person .... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities ... shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe...
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person...
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources...
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study ....
Id.
45. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); see 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra
note 23, at xv.
46. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xv.
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the House Committee on Ways and Means on May 20, 1980.4 7 The
Committee of the Whole subsequently amended the Bill and reported the
amended version back to the House.48 It was finally enacted on Septem-
ber 23, 1980. 49
H.R. 7020 authorized governmental response to an actual or
threatened dangerous hazardous waste release.50 Such hazardous re-
leases, under the language of the Bill, included oil. The Bill established a
$600 million fund that was split between government appropriations and
fees on oil, petroleum, chemical feedstocks, and inorganic substances.5"
The Bill's scope was confined to nonoperational hazardous waste sites on
land or nonnavigable waters and specifically excluded oil or other pollu-
tion of navigable waters.12 Notably, it is the only one of the four compet-
ing measures to specifically exclude oil from the scope of coverage.
3. Senate Bill 1341 (S. 1341)
On June 14, 1979 Senator Culver introduced S. 1341, the Carter
Administration's response to the toxic waste problem. 3 The Bill was
drafted largely in response to the events at Love Canal.54 Senate Bill
1341 authorized the government to respond to oil and hazardous sub-
stance pollution of navigable waters.5 A $1.6 billion fund, primarily de-
rived from government appropriations and taxes on oil, chemical
feedstocks, and inorganic substances, was to be used to finance response
activities.56 This Bill also called for owners and operators of polluting
entities to be jointly, severally, and strictly liable for the costs of cleaning
up pollution damage. 7
After its introduction the Bill was referred to the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works. That committee then sent the Bill
47. 1 id. at xv.
48. 1 id.
49. 1 id.
50. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3041 (1980).
51. Id. § 3051.
52. Id. § 3021; Grad, supra note 28, at 4.
53. S. 1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note
23, at xvi.
54. MARY D. WOROBEC & GIRARD ORDWAY, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROLS GUIDE:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 188 (1989); see supra text
accompanying notes 21-22.
55. S. 1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1979); see 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra
note 23, at xvi.
56. S. 1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 606 (1979).
57. Id. § 604.
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into subcommittees, where the Bill was compared with S. 1480 and was
subsequently allowed to die.5 8
4. Senate Bill 1480 (S. 1480)
Senators Culver and Muskie sponsored S. 1480 on July 11, 1979;' 9
this was the legislation that environmentalists most favored.6 This Bill,
entitled the Environmental Emergency Response Act,61 was more sweep-
ing in scope than the other bills Congress was considering, and included
liability for personal injury as well as liability for hazardous waste trans-
porters on a joint and several basis. 2 The Bill established a $4.1 billion
fund, derived from appropriations and taxes on primary petrochemicals,
inorganic raw materials, and oil, and covered a wide variety of hazardous
substances, including oil. 3 Oil, however, was subsequently and inexpli-
cably excluded as a hazardous substance from all versions of S. 14 80.'
5. The Stafford-Randolph Compromise
November 1980 was a major election year, with the Carter Adminis-
tration reeling from the effects of inflation 65 and the Iran Hostage cri-
sis.6 6 The election brought significant changes in the composition of the
58. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xvi.
59. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see Grad, supra note 28, at 6.
60. See Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal. Joint Hearings on S, 1341 and S. 1480
Before the Subcomms on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1979) (statement on
behalf of Environmental Defense Fund and others).
61. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
62. Id. § 4; see Grad, supra note 28, at 22.
63. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1979); see 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra
note 23, at xvii-xviii.
64. See I ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xvii-xviii; Grad, supra note 28,
at 6-8.
65. In the wake of a massive presidential election victory for Ronald Reagan, two-thirds of
the voters polled stated that the key to their vote centered on worries about unemployment,
inflation, and other economic issues. The November Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1980, at
A34.
66. In November 1979 Iranian religious fundamentalists took 53 Americans hostage at the
American Embassy in Teheran. These hostages were held in captivity for a total of 444 days
and the United States seemed helpless to act. The only attempted rescue of the hostages re-
sulted in the deaths of eight American soldiers. Ultimately, the hostages were released as a
result of President Carter's executive order issued in the last days of his presidency. The exec-
utive order released part of the estimated $12 billion in Iranian assets frozen at the beginning
of the crisis. See Howell Raines, Hostages Hailed at the White House: Reagan Vows "Swift
Retribution" for Any New Attack on Diplomats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1981, at Al; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Issue and Debate: Should Reagan Honor Deal with Iran?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1981, at All.
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nation's leadership. 67 After election day the 96th Congress found itself
operating essentially as a lame duck, and there was increased pressure to
push through legislation that the incoming administration would other-
wise ignore.68 It was therefore important for Congress to pass a compre-
hensive environmental law, and competition between similar bills, as well
as pressure from special interest groups, threatened to completely derail
this effort. Thus, in an attempt to revive the sinking effort, two com-
promises were introduced in the final days of the session.69
On November 18, 1980 Senators Stafford, Mitchell, Randolph,
Moynihan, Bradley, Heinz, Burdick, Williams, and Leary proposed an
amendment to S. 1480, which was essentially a complete substitute for
the original Bill.70 This compromise measure included several changes
67. One source noted that
one way to describe the magnitude of Ronald Reagan's victory is:... [c]ome Janu-
ary, Ted Kennedy will no longer chair the Senate Judiciary Committee, nor William
Proxmire the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee; and Herman Tal-
madge, who used to supervise Agriculture, including food stamps, won't be in the
Senate at all.
The tide that has swept the country is unquestionably Republican.
The November Surprise, supra note 65, at A34.
68. Shortly after the election, Representatives David Stockman and Jack Kemp, two of
President-elect Reagan's closest advisors, issued a memo announcing a "bold" new economic
proposal. William Nordhaus, Economic Affairs: That Stockman/Kemp Proposal, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1980, at C2. The memo proposed a "rollback of Federal social regulations, particu-
larly in the environment, health and safety." Id.
69. Grad, supra note 28, at 19; see also WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 13 ("The 96th Con-
gress, at virtually its 'eleventh hour,' passed in haste a compromise bill .... ").
70. The records often reflect the pressure that Congress faced as the session drew to a
close. Senator Stafford's introductory statement reveals the concern for finding a compromise
measure before the end of the session:
The compromise embodies concessions that I would otherwise not make. But I
make the concessions because, even as we discuss the issue in this chamber, more
chemical poisons are being released into our environment, threatening the health and
well being of present and future generations of Americans.
It remains my view that the need to develop legislation to deal with toxic sub-
stances demands the highest priority of the Congress. We have worked on it for two
Congresses already, and 80 percent of the public believes legislation is needed.
126 CONG. REc. 30,113 (1980) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
Senator Mitchell also echoed the need for compromise:
[A]s the 96th Congress draws to a close, efforts have been made to delay Senate
consideration of S. 1480.
In light of the lateness of the date and the urgent need for a Federal response to
the ever-growing problem of toxic wastes, I am pleased to cosponsor a substitute to S.
1480 introduced today by my colleague from Vermont, Senator Stafford.
Mr. President, there are elements of S. 1480 that are not contained in this substi-
tute bill. The provisions we have eliminated were those that generated considerable
controversy, resulting in delay of Senate passage of S. 1480. While I supported these
provisions, I am willing to accommodate the concerns expressed, in a spirit of com-
promise ....
Id. at 30,114 (1980) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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from the original Bill.71 The compromise, however, was deemed unac-
ceptable, and a week later a second compromise was introduced. 2
The Senate adopted the second compromise measure on November
24, 1980. 7 ' Because the compromise bill was a tax measure that must
constitutionally originate in the House,74 the Senate took the House-ap-
proved H.R. 7020, substituted the entirety of S. 1480, and passed the
measure.75 In remarks to the Senate, Senator Randolph contrasted the
Senate measure with the original H.R. 7020 and stated that the House
Bill was too narrow because it only dealt with hazardous waste sites.76
Referring to H.R. 85, the Senator noted that this Bill also was too nar-
rowly crafted because it focused only on oil spills.7 7 Although the Sen-
ate's new measure failed to address oil spills, Senator Randolph
rationalized that the new measure provided a broader reach to the gen-
eral problem of hazardous waste clean up.
78
The House began considering the Bill on December 3, 1980, and
many members of Congress felt that they were presented with a "take it
or leave it proposition" because the congressional session would soon be
ending.79 Ultimately, with time running out, the House passed the Staf-
ford-Randolph Compromise as H.R. 7020, and, with President Carter's
signature, the Bill became law on December 11, 1980.80
Thus, from inception to enactment, CERCLA was hastily conceived
and rushed through the legislative process. Ambiguity, inefficiency, and
inefficacy, which might have been resolved in a more deliberative legisla-
71. Among the most significant changes embodied in the initial compromise proposal were
the elimination of a federal cause of action, liability for personal injury and property loss,
limitation of third-party liability, and the introduction of a third-party defense. The fund-to
be applied toward clean up of hazardous sites-was reduced from $4.1 billion to $2.7 billion,
and the contribution ratio between government and industry was rendered more favorable to
industry. I ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xix.
72. The most significant changes in the second version of the compromise were the elimi-
nation of all third-party compensation-including medical expenses for victims of hazardous
substance releases, a $50 million compensation limit on natural resource damage, and a further
clean-up fund reduction from $2.7 billion to $1.6 billion, spread over a five-year period. Id. at
xx.
73. 126 CONG. REC. 14,988 (1980).
74. The Constitution provides that "[a]ll bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other bills." U.S. CONT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
75. 126 CONG. REC. 15,009 (1980).
76. Grad, supra note 28, at 22.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See I THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INT., supra note 23, at xxi.
80. 1 id.
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tive process, have been left for judicial resolution, resulting in problems
with interpretation that continue to mount.
III. CERCLA: THE FINAL OUTCOME
CERCLA regulates the clean up of hazardous substance releases
into any part of the environment, including air, water, and land.81 It
further requires the reporting of hazardous substance releases, 82 as well
as the location of hazardous storage, treatment, and disposal sites.8" The
statute also establishes the Superfund, a trust fund to pay for hazardous
waste clean up, derived from taxes imposed on oil and chemicals, as well
as fines and penalties levied by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).
8 4
CERCLA's primary goals are evident from the face of the statute.
First, the statute seeks to establish a comprehensive governmental re-
sponse to actual or threatened hazardous substance releases.8 The law is
predominantly concerned with orphaned facilities-where ownership is
undetermined and the site is closed or no longer operating as it once
was-and sites owned or operated by persons who do not have the finan-
cial resources or who are unwilling to undertake appropriate response
action.86 Second, the statute establishes a federal fund, primarily fi-
nanced by taxing private industry, to pay for response87 costs that gov-
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (1988); see WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 185-86.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9603.
83. Angus Macbeth, Superfund: The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980, in EXPANDING LIABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 4
(1981).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9631, repealed by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1772 (codified at I.R.C. § 9507 (1988)); see
WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 186.
85. WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 187.
86. Id.
87. Under CERCLA a "response" is defined to mean "remove, removal, remedy, and re-
medial action; [ ] all such terms... include enforcement activities related thereto." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(25) (footnotes omitted). The statute provides for two different types of responses to
hazardous waste releases-removal and remedial actions. A removal action means "the
cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment .... The term
includes ... security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water
supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided
for ... " Id. § 9601(23).
Remedial actions are "those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or
in addition to removal actions.., to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances
so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health or
welfare or the environment." Id. § 9601(24). Remedial actions most often take the form of
containment by use of dikes, trenches, and other means of storage. Also included are methods
for neutralization, recycling, or destruction of the hazardous waste. Id.
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ernmental agencies incur."8 The fund also pays for the assessment and
restoration costs associated with hazardous release damage to natural re-
sources.8 9 Finally, the statute provides a federal cause of action to re-
cover the costs incurred for responses to releases.90 This cause of action
extends to any potentially responsible party (PRP). PRPs are broken
into four distinct classes: (1) current owners and operators; (2) owners
and operators at the time of disposal; (3) generators of the substances;
and (4) transporters of the substances.91
CERCLA is essentially a "deep pockets" measure through which
Congress intended to gain access to the financial resources of any com-
pany that qualifies as a PRP, regardless of the PRP's degree of responsi-
bility for the release.92  The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),93 which Congress passed in 1986,
gave the EPA more control over settlement options with PRPs, estab-
lished a strict time frame for initiating a clean-up response, required as-
sessment of the threats that individual sites pose to human health, and
increased state and public participation in the decision-making process.94
Generally speaking, there are four requirements necessary to estab-
lish liability under CERCLA: (1) A determination must be made that
the site involved is a "facility" under the definition of the statute;95 (2) a
"release" or "threatened release," as defined by the statute,96 must have
occurred at the site; (3) the government or a private party must have
incurred response costs as a result of the release; and (4) there is a deter-
88. See WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 14.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C); see Macbeth, supra note 83, at 4.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3); see Macbeth, supra note 83, at 4.
91. WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 14.
92. Cope, supra note 4, at 542-43.
93. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988)
and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
94. WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 186.
95. The statute defines a facility as
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline ... well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been de-
posited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
96. The statutory definition of release includes "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). Excluded from the definition of release are releases
that only result in exposure to employees solely in the workplace; emissions from motor vehi-
cles and aircraft or pipeline pumping engines; releases of source, byproduct, or special nuclear
material; and releases resulting from the normal application of fertilizer. Id.
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mination that the defendant is a PRP.9 7 The petroleum exclusion pri-
marily relates to the second prong of this test-the determination that a
hazardous substance has been released. Because the statute provides that
oil and petroleum are not hazardous substances,98 the statute does not
cover releases of these substances.
IV. THE MYSTERY OF THE PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
A. Overview of the Petroleum Exclusion
Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines a "hazardous substance" as
any substance listed in the regulations that govern the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976, sections 311 and 307 of the Clean
Water Act of 1977, and section 112 of the Clean Air Act. 99 The statute
declares, however, that "[t]he term does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof that is not otherwise specifically listed or
designated as a hazardous substance" under other provisions of the stat-
ute.1" This exemption from coverage for releases involving petroleum
products has become known as the petroleum exclusion,1"1 and litigation
to determine which substances are excluded has recently become more
common.1
0 2
The difficulty courts face in petroleum exclusion cases is ascertain-
ing Congress's rationale for creating the petroleum exclusion in CER-
CLA. Due to the dearth of legislative history on CERCLA in general,
and especially regarding the petroleum exclusion, courts have been left
with little legislative guidance.1 13 The interpretive problems generally
center on the language surrounding the term "fraction." 1" It is not the
oil or gasoline itself that is particularly dangerous, but the chemical com-
97. Id. § 9607(a); see Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating
elements required for prima facie case under CERCLA).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 191-92 (providing concise sum-
mary of CERCLA's hazardous substances definition).
101. See Cose, 4 F.3d at 700; Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881
F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 981 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
102. See, e.g., Cose, 4 F.3d at 700 (holding that crude oil tank bottoms are not "petroleum"
and not subject to CERCLA's petroleum exclusion); Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 801 (holding that
petroleum exclusion applieg to refined and unrefined gasoline); see also Ulvestad v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that California Hazardous Substance
Account Act, modeled after Superfund, excludes regulation of refined petroleum); Zands v.
Nelson, 797 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (involving claim under Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act for leaking underground gasoline storage tanks).
103. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 805-06.
104. Id. at 804. According to the court in United States v. Western Processing Co., "frac-
tion" is simply "a term of art for the products separated or refined from crude oil or petro-
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ponents of petroleum. Among petroleum's chemical constituents are
benzene, xylene, ethyl-benzene, and toluene. 10 5 Many of these compo-
nents are listed separately in the statute as hazardous substances, 10 6 but
as long as the chemicals are part of petroleum or crude oil, or a refined
fraction thereof-such as gasoline-courts have excluded them from
CERCLA.10 7
The exclusion's existence appears counterintuitive because it incom-
pletely addresses the health concerns associated with certain releases of
known and otherwise prohibited hazardous chemicals. Moreover, there
is no stated reason in the statute or legislative history for its develop-
ment. The seemingly illogical result of deeming a substance hazardous in
its pure form, but not hazardous when mixed with other chemicals to
form petroleum, is disturbing because exposure to the chemical results in
the same health threat in either form."08 This twist on logic is even more
troubling when the harmful nature of these chemicals is taken into ac-
count. 10 9 The dangerous nature of these chemicals warrant inclusion,
not exclusion, in CERCLA.
B. Legislative and Administrative Discussion
One commentator has noted that CERCLA's "legislative history
has proven perhaps most useful to determine what Congress did not en-
leum." 761 F. Supp. 713, 722 (W.D. Wash. 1991). Thus, gasoline is perhaps the simplest
example of a fraction of petroleum or crude oil.
105. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 803. Each of these chemicals may have a substantial effect
on human health. See NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, NIOSH
RECOMMENDATIONS, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS (1988), available
in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Drugdex File [hereinafter NIOSH].
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988); Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 804-05.
107. E.g., Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 803.
108. For example, benzene has been associated with the development of leukemia in
humans, see NIOSH, supra note 105, and gasoline, of which benzene is a component, has
likewise been associated with leukemia, see World Health Org. Int'l Agency for Research on
Cancer, Occupational Exposures in Petroleum Refining; Crude Oil and Major Petroleum Fuels,
45 IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS 159,
184 (1989) [hereinafter World Health Org.].
109. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is responsible for
periodic updates and recommendations relating to workplace exposure to potentially hazard-
ous substances. See NIOSH, supra note 105. In devising its recommendations, NIOSH exam-
ines all known and available scientific information relevant to particular hazards. Id.
According to NIOSH, benzene is associated with leukemia, xylene is a known central nervous
system depressant and respiratory irritant, and toluene is known to have serious impact on the
respiratory system. Id. Additional medical studies have found increased risks of urothelial,
lymphatic, colorectal, liver, and pancreatic cancers due to exposure to benzene. See Gunnar
Steineck et al., Increased Risk of Urothelial Cancer in Stockholm During 1985-87 After Expo-
sure to Benzene and Exhausts, 45 INT'L J. OF CANCER 1012 (1990); Stephen R. Zoloth et al.,
Patterns of Mortality Among Commercial Pressmen, 76 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1047 (1986).
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act rather than what it did enact." ' As to the petroleum exclusion,
there is little explicit reference to the issue. Therefore, looking at the
circumstances surrounding the statute's passage may provide insight as
to Congress's possible intent for providing the exclusion.
1. The last minute compromise
Significantly, CERCLA's final form was not the result of extended
congressional planning and discussion. As noted earlier, time was run-
ning out on the legislature due to the election of a new president and a
substantial turnover in congressional seats." 1 If any environmental leg-
islation was going to be approved, it had to be done with haste, and that
meant compromise. Congress was already looking to the oil industry to
subsidize a substantial portion of the Superfund;112 therefore, placing ad-
ditional burdens or liability on this industry may have proven difficult.
Certainly, such a move would have led to prolonged debate since special
interest groups could have pressured their respective representatives for
protection from the additional burdens or liabilities. 13 But with time
running out, Congress could not afford an extended discussion.
Congress, however, did discuss the need for legislation covering oil
spills.1 14 Representative Biaggi was particularly concerned that H.R.
110. WHITMAN, supra note 17, at 13.
111. See Grad, supra note 28, at 1.
112. See id. at 30.
113. In 1977 President Carter stated that "the influence of the oil companies, both in the
legislative process, in the Executive Branch of the government as well, in the economic struc-
ture of our country, is enormous." President: 'Potential War Profiteering' in Energy Crisis,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1977, at A8. Among those who lobby for oil interests are high ranking
officials of oil producing states. A good example is a plan developed by the Oklahoma state
legislature to fly members of the legislature and the governor to Washington, D.C., to lobby
Congress and President Reagan on behalf of the oil industry. David Zizzo, Oklahoma Consid-
ers D.C. Airlift, UPI, Apr. 9, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. The plan
included was a call for leaders from other states, including Texas and Louisiana, to join in the
"airlift." Id. More recently, the oil industry lobby actively sought to defeat a number of bills
proposed by the Alaska legislature in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. New Spill Bills
Aimed at Oil Industry, UPI, May 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
114. In the House debate on the Senate amended version of H.R. 7020, Representative
Biaggi noted,
I think the Members of this House can understand the difficulty of my decision
and the frustration I feel in the omission of an oilspill title from the bill ....
The reasons why there is no oilspill title in this bill are complex ....
... No action was taken on the oilspill provisions of H.R. 85. The result is... a
superfund bill that is considerably less than super.
As I see it, H.R. 7020 is not a bad bill-it is just an incomplete one. But it is a
first step in addressing a serious problem. It is my earnest hope that we can take the
next steps early in the next Congress.
126 CONG. REc. 31,974 (1980) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
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85's ll elements concerning oil spills were not included in the final mea-
sure the Senate passed.116 The fact that H.R. 85 contained a provision
covering oil spills indicates that some members of Congress were aware
of the problem of oil and petroleum releases-at least those that occurred
on a grand scale. In the earlier bills-such as H.R. 85-references to oil
releases were specifically directed toward oil spills on navigable water-
ways.1 1 7 These previous references indicate that oil spills were viewed as
the primary hazard associated with petroleum releases, and shows a lack
of awareness of the type of releases that are now becoming more
common.
118
The Senate also considered an amendment to S. 1480111 early in the
legislative process that would have created a separate fund for payments
of claims arising out of oil spills. 120 Once again, however, the amend-
ment was discarded, 12' and there is little or no discussion as to the rea-
sons underlying its abandonment. It is likely that Congress perceived
problems in taxing the oil industry to finance the general fund while
holding the same industry financially liable for spills. Congress must
have been aware that the oil industry would not have acceded to such a
measure without a fight given the opposition mounted by the industry to
oil spill legislation in general. 122 Thus, in a compromise effort to get the
bill passed, Congress may have simply developed the petroleum exclu-
sion to avoid pressure from the oil industry's strong lobby.
2. Equity considerations
Another possible reason for the petroleum exclusion may have been
Congress's determination that, because the petroleum industry was bear-
ing a major share of Superfund's financing, 123 the industry had already
115. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
116. ld
117. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at xiv; Grad, supra note 28, at 3.
118. See infra part IV.B.4.
119. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
120. 126 CONG. REC. 21,377 (1980). Senator Gravel, upon introduction of the amendment,
stated,
I am submitting for printing an amendment to S. 1480, the Environmental Emer-
gency Response Act, called the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of
1980. This provision creates a Federal trust fund for the payment of claims due to oil
spills supported by a tax on oil produced or consumed in the United States.
... Money in the fund is to be used, in part, for the restoration, rehabilitation
and replacement of natural resources injured or destroyed by oil spills.
Id.
121. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 23, at 22.
122. See l id. at xiv.
123. See WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 189; Grad, supra note 28, at 30.
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paid its fair share. Thus, in the interest of equity, Congress may have
believed that the oil industry should not face additional financial liabil-
ity. 124 At the time of CERCLA's passage, there were problems in the
Middle East and the Carter Administration was dealing with the final
days of the Iran Hostage crisis. 2 Additionally, the oil markets were in
turmoil and there was a perception that the oil industry was reeling from
the effects of the turbulent markets. 126 Thus, Congress may have be-
lieved it was unreasonable to place the oil industry in a position in which
it would assume potential economic burdens above and beyond the initial
CERCLA tax.
Congress may also have been concerned about the impact, or per-
haps the perceived impact, on consumers. Costs of increased financial
burdens on the oil industry could have been redistributed through in-
creases in gasoline and other petroleum-driven prices-such as products
that are petroleum-based (plastics) or that require high amounts of en-
ergy to produce. During the period in which the legislation was being
considered, Americans had witnessed dramatic increases in gasoline
prices and long lines at gas stations.1 27 There was fear that the increasing
prices would push an already troubled economy into a deeper reces-
sion.1 28 Economists for the Carter Administration estimated that in-
creasing oil prices would result in a loss of 250,000 American jobs by the
end of 1980.129 Congress undoubtedly had serious and legitimate con-
cerns about the public perception of the legislature placing additional
burdens on consumers.
124. The notion that the oil industry contributed more than its fair share to Superfund is
reflected in statements made during the 1986 hearings on the reauthorization of the Superfund:
[S]ome people say that we should tax the groups that are the most responsible for the
waste that Superfund is designed to clean up, and as a matter of policy I agree with
this. Unfortunately, people have been hoodwinked into believing that the major
cause of hazardous waste at our Superfund sites is the petroleum industry. The facts
tell a much different story.
We are facing a question of equity. This is not a "polluter pays" financing
mechanism. We are forcing an industry that is already suffering immensely to shoul-
der a societal burden for which it is only partially responsible.
132 CONG. REC. 14,935 (1986) (statement of Sen. Nickles on establishing broad-based tax for
financing Superfund instead of relying heavily on industry taxes).
125. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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3. Oil spills receive coverage in other statutes
An alternative argument for establishing the petroleum exclusion
may have been the belief that oil spills were sufficiently addressed in
other environmental statutes, including section 311 of the Clean Water
Act of 1977.130 Under section 311, surface waters of the United States
are protected from oil and hazardous substances spills.131 Given that the
competing bills considered prior to CERCLA's passage focused attention
on oil spills in navigable waters, it is quite possible that Congress per-
ceived an overlap.132 Thus, when confronted with resistance from the
petroleum industry, Congress may have been willing to compromise and
allow the petroleum exclusion because it believed the problem was ad-
dressed elsewhere.
New problems involving leaking underground storage tanks have
developed since CERCLA was passed. In 1984 Congress addressed this
rapidly expanding concern with amendments to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act.133 The amendments created new provisions
targeted at the management of underground storage tanks (USTs) con-
taining certain substances.134 Regulated substances include those desig-
nated as hazardous under CERCLA, with the addition of petroleum,
crude oil, and fractions thereof.' 35 The new regulations establish stan-
130. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); see also Macbeth, supra note 83, at 58
("One can expect that Superfund will now be the dominant statute for hazardous substance
spills, but 311 remains important for oil spills.").
131. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(l)-(7) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
132. Similar to Superfund, section 311 established an emergency fund that can be employed
to finance clean-up costs of oil spills and other chemical discharges on navigable waters.
WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 140. Some officials have charged that the Clean
Water Act is ineffective at addressing the problems of oil pollution damage beyond the clean-
up costs. H.R. 85 Hearings, supra note 25, at 62. During congressional hearings, Admiral
Wayne Caldwell stated that
[t]he lack of legislation addressing third-party damages has led to the enactment
of several Federal statutes which establish special purpose compensation funds....
The Coast Guard supports the superfund concept, which will repeal the legisla-
tion establishing these special purpose funds and provide a single, uniform approach
to oil pollution liability and compensation.
Id.
133. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). In 1986 the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) released the results of a study targeted toward identifying leaking
storage tanks. See Candace C. Gauthier, The Enforcement of Federal Underground Storage
Tank Regulations, 20 ENVTL. L. 261, 262 (1990). The study was conducted over a two-year
period and found that out of 433 tanks tested for leaks, 35% were found to be leaking. Id.
134. See Mary Elizabeth Bosco & Russell V. Randle, Underground Storage Tanks (UST),
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 607, 607 (J. Gordon Arbuckle et al. eds., 10th ed.
1989); Walter E. Mugdan & Bruce R. Adler, The 1984 RCRA Amendments: Congress as a
Regulatory Agency, 18 LAND Usa & ENV'T L. REV. 487, 515 (1987).
135. Mugdan & Adler, supra note 134, at 516.
[Vol. 27:11571174
PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
dards for tank construction, leak detection, and response actions, and set
requirements for proof of financial responsibility for potential releases.
136
RCRA requires hazardous waste generators and transporters, and
operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to conform with
certain regulatory requirements. 137 Those requirements include a system
of notification and record keeping that ensures that the waste can be
tracked over a thirty-year period. 138 The regulations require notification
of the EPA of the existence, type, size, age, and location of USTs, includ-
ing tanks taken out of service since 1974.139 Thus, an argument might be
made that CERCLA is unnecessary to address leaking storage tanks. As
addressed in Part V, without CERCLA, coverage of these problems is
incomplete.
4. Lack of knowledge
Another consideration relating to the overlap of the statutes may
have been the state of knowledge in 1980 regarding the types of problems
to be expected from various sources of pollution. Love Canal was the
first indication that there was a serious threat from buried chemical
waste, and much of CERCLA's thrust was designed to meet that
threat."4 The legislative discussion of the need for oil spill legislation
focused on the known threat at that time-oil spills due to shipping and
offshore drilling. 141 Those spills constituted a clear and present danger,
and the perception was that there was already statutory protection in
place to combat that danger.142
Modem hazards, however, reflect new problems that the 96th Con-
gress may not have foreseen. Tanks used for gasoline storage are aging;
consequently, the number and severity of gasoline spills from ruptured
136. See Gauthier, supra note 133, at 264-65. In order to show financial responsibility,
owners and operators handling more than ten thousand gallons of petroleum in a month must
have financial resources of one million dollars. Bosco & Randle, supra note 134, at 632. These
funds must be available to pay for corrective action and third-party compensation for bodily
injury or property damage. Id. Owners of less than ten thousand gallons must show financial
resources of $500,000. Id. The financial responsibility may be shown through guarantee or
surety bond, insurance policy, trust fund, letter of credit, or other mechanisms as state law
dictates. Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 6991 (1988); see WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 167-68.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c); see WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 157.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a).
140. See 126 CONG. REC. 26,347 (1980) (comments of Representative Weiss calling Love
Canal the most notorious hazardous waste site).
141. H.R. 85 Hearings, supra note 25, at 53-54 (statement of Representative Biaggi noting
enormous damage from massive oil spills involving ships and offshore rigs).
142. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the New York Times editorial concerning the
serious dangers that an increasing number of oil spills pose.
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and rotting tanks are increasing.'43 This problem is most clearly re-
flected in the kinds of environmental cases that have received recent judi-
cial attention. 1"
The scope of the problem is reflected in Representative Downey's
remarks in hearings on the reauthorization of Superfund:
In mid-1983, nearly 100,000 gallons of gasoline, from storage
tanks belonging to a gasoline station in the Bluebell Lane
neighborhood [of North Babylon, New Jersey], leaked into the
ground. As a result, the neighborhood has been inundated with
fumes containing benzene, toluene, and xylene. These chemi-
cals are dangerously toxic ....
I requested assistance from the Environmental Protection
Agency for the residents on two occasions and was denied both
times. The responses I received clearly depicted an Agency
bound by legal shackles. The Federal Superfund program ex-
plicitly excludes petroleum in its definition of hazardous sub-
stances. Therefore, EPA could not provide any assistance to
the people of Bluebell Lane.
... [W]hile the precise number of gasoline storage tanks
range from 1.2 million up to 10 million, some have suggested
that between 20 and 40 percent of all tanks are leaking. Others
have estimated that over 100,000 storage tanks are leaking na-
tionwide and that this number could grow to 350,000 in the
next five years. 
4
143. Attorneys for the Department of Justice and the EPA posited that a narrow interpreta-
tion of the petroleum exclusion would divert valuable resources away from critical toxic waste
sites. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 14, Wilshire
Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5708)
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]. Yet the "EPA estimates that the number of releases of
leaded gasoline from underground storage tanks alone, just at retail motor fuel facilities, may
exceed 100,000." Id. at 4 n.5. In addition, the EPA estimates that there are nearly 1.4 million
underground storage tanks in the United States, with 95% storing petroleum. Id.
144. See, e.g., Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (involv-
ing leaking gasoline storage tanks that contaminated plaintiff's property); Zands v. Nelson, 797
F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (involving soil and groundwater contamination due to leakage of
thousands of gallons of gasoline from 'underground storage tanks); Lyden Co. v. Citgo Petro-
leum Corp., No. 1:91CV1967, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,783, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 1991)
(involving leaking gasoline storage tanks that contaminated plaintiff's property).
145. Superfund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tour-
ism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1007 (1985). One
article dramatically illustrated the severity of the problem by stating that "'[t]he potential for
contamination from [leaking underground gasoline tanks] is not small.' One gallon of gasoline
per day leaking into groundwater supply is enough to pollute the water of a 50,000 person
community to a level of 100 parts per million." Troubled Waters: Gasoline Leaks Threaten
1176 [Vol. 27:1157
PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
Thus, Congress may have been unaware of the threat of petroleum
leaks into the subsoil and groundwater supplies when it considered the
petroleum exclusion, and therefore may have been oblivious to the grav-
ity of harm that would escape CERCLA because of the petroleum exclu-
sion. In light of expanding problems with leaking gasoline storage tanks,
it is time to repeal the petroleum exclusion.
C. Judicial Construction
In interpreting the petroleum exclusion, courts generally consider
the statute's plain meaning first,146 and then its legislative history.147 In
relying on the statute's plain meaning, courts have held that the petro-
leum exclusion applies to refined and unrefined petroleum products, even
if certain chemicals that are statutorily designated as hazardous sub-
stances have been added to the petroleum. 148 In recent cases the defini-
tions of "petroleum" and "fraction" as used in the petroleum exclusion's
language have created the most difficulty for the courts. 149
In looking to CERCLA's legislative history, courts have found that
there is little or no information about the exclusion. 50 Thus, the courts
have been forced to follow standard rules of statutory interpretation in
applying the statute." The interpretive problems courts confront at-
tempting to make sense of the ambiguous language are compounded by
the highly technical nature of the statute's subject matter. Thus, it is
understandable why courts have interpreted the statute in conflicting
ways.
Most Groundwater Supplies, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Dec. 8, 1983, at 16 (quoting Jack
E. Ravan, former EPA Assistant Administrator for Water).
146. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 803.
147. Id. at 805.
148. See id. at 801 (holding that petroleum exclusion applies to refined and unrefined gaso-
line); Zoufal v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 91-CV-70895-DT, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 1993) (relying on Wilshire); Bunger v. Hartman, 797 F. Supp. 968, 969
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (dismissing plaintiff's claim because hazardous substances discovered on site
were derived from petroleum products); Lyden Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,783 (citing
Wilshire and holding that petroleum exclusion applies to refined and unrefined gasoline).
149. See, e.g., Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700, 708 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that crude oil
tank bottoms do not fall within plain meaning of definition of "fraction" or "petroleum");
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. California, 790 F. Supp. 983, 987 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that
petroleum exclusion covers all forms of petroleum).
150. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 805 (finding "virtually no legislative history contemporane-
ous with the enactment of CERCLA directly relevant to the scope of the petroleum
exclusion").
151. The first step in statutory interpretation is to look to the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 803. The next step is to examine the statute's legislative history. Id. at 805. Courts next
resort to the interpretation rendered by the administrative agency with oversight responsibility
for the statute. Id. at 808.
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1. Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corporation: The
first judicial interpretation of the petroleum exclusion
The first comprehensive judicial analysis of the petroleum exclu-
sion's scope occurred in Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Rich-
field Corporation .152 The plaintiffs filed suit to recover clean-up costs
incurred as a result of leaking underground storage tanks containing gas-
oline. 153 The complaint alleged that because the gasoline contained addi-
tives including benzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl-benzene, and lead-all
listed as hazardous substances under CERCLA-the petroleum exclu-
sion should not bar recovery.1 54 The court initially defined the issue as a
question of whether the petroleum exclusion included refined gasoline
and all of its components and additives.1I 5 The court primarily relied on
the plain meaning of the statute to conclude that the petroleum exclusion
"exclude[s] gasoline, even leaded gasoline, from the term 'hazardous sub-
stance' for purposes of CERCLA.' 6
The plaintiffs, however, argued for recovery on a different theory,
relying on the "doctrine of the last antecedent," 157 a principle of statu-
tory construction that focuses on how words in a sentence are qualified
by subsequent words.1 58 The plaintiffs focused on the phrase "does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous sub-
stance." 159 The plaintiffs insisted that the limiting words-"which is not
otherwise specifically listed"-modify the preceding phrase, "does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof."' 160 The
plaintiffs contended that the language thus created an exception to the
petroleum exclusion.
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' interpretation.' 6' The court
noted that, under the plaintiffs' interpretation, substances such as lead, as
152. 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 802.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 803.
156. Id. at 804.
157. Id
158. The doctrine of last antecedents is a rule used in statutory construction that says that
relative or qualifying words or phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases
immediately preceding, and as not extending to or including other words, phrases, or
clauses more remote, unless such extension or inclusion is clearly required by the
intent and meaning of the context, or disclosed by an examination of the entire act.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (6th ed. 1990).





a specifically listed substance, would be excepted from the petroleum ex-
clusion and the plaintiffs could maintain a cause of action.1 62 This ap-
proach would essentially swallow up the petroleum exclusion. 163 The
court concluded that the limiting language applied only to the term
"fraction," and that the plaintiffs' reading extended to language that was
too remote and thus was grammatically incorrect.'6
After ruling against the plaintiffs based on the statute's plain mean-
ing, the court then examined the legislative history and agency interpre-
tation of the petroleum exclusion. 161 In examining the legislative history,
the court noted that specific references contemporaneous with the pas-
sage of CERCLA were lacking.166 The court then turned its attention to
subsequent congressional action when legislators had the opportunity to
amend the statute.1
67
The court first considered the introduction of H.R. 1881 in 1985,
which would have amended CERCLA to repeal the petroleum exclu-
sion.168 The Bill would have allowed CERCLA to apply to crude oil,
petroleum, or any fraction thereof, provided the substance was otherwise
listed as hazardous under section 101(14).169 The Bill never progressed
beyond its introduction. 170
The court then considered The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984,171 which added a provision to the Solid Waste Disposal
Act (SWDA), 172 providing for regulation of underground storage
tanks.' 73 The court accorded weight to Senator Durenberger's com-
ments during the introduction of the amendments, when he stated that
"'spills of the fuel cannot be cleaned up under the Superfund law be-
cause it is a petroleum product.' "1'4 The court also relied on Senator
Simpson's comments during the Senate debate on the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), the 1986 amendments to CER-
CLA, in which he stated that
162. Id. at 805.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 804-05.
165. Id. at 805-10.
166. Id. at 805.
167. Id. at 806.
168. Id. (citing H.R. 1881, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).
172. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A.).
173. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 806-08.
174. Id. at 807 (quoting 130 CONG. Rac. 52,028, 52,080 (1984)).
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"[t]his bill will not diminish the scope of the present petroleum
exclusion. That provision.., excludes from the definition of
'hazardous substances' all types of petroleum, including crude
oil, crude oil tank bottoms, refined fractions of crude oil, and
tank bottoms of such which are not specifically listed or desig-
nated as a hazardous substance under the other subparagraphs
of that provision."
175
The court concluded its analysis of the legislative history by noting
that while postenactment developments are not as persuasive as contem-
poraneous history, they are entitled to some weight. 176 Thus, the most
compelling evidence for the court was the SWDA amendments, which
specifically targeted leaking gasoline and incorporated the unchanged
wording of the petroleum exclusion in the SARA amendments.1 77 The
court viewed this fact as an acknowledgement that Congress intended to
exclude gasoline from CERCLA coverage.
178
As the next step in its attempt to deduce Congress's intent, the court
analyzed the EPA's administrative interpretation of the exclusion.
179
The court cited, but did not discuss, the content of three EPA memo-
randa, as well as three pronouncements in the Federal Register.8 The
court concluded that the EPA's interpretation of the exclusion was con-
sistent with both the petroleum exclusion's plain meaning and the legisla-
tive history, and therefore provided "highly persuasive evidence" that the
court's interpretation was correct. 81
In sum, the court held that "the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA
[applies] to unrefined and refined gasoline even though certain of its in-
digenous components and certain additives during the refining process
have themselves been designated as hazardous substances within the
meaning of CERCLA."
18 2
2. Subsequent judicial interpretation
Although few cases prior to Wilshire raised the issue of the petro-
leum exclusion, several subsequent cases have explored the exclusion's





180. Id. at 808 n.8.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 810.
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scope. In Zoufal v. Amoco Oil Co. ,183 as in Wilshire, the plaintiffs sought
damages for the cost of cleaning up contamination from leaking under-
ground gasoline storage tanks. 184 The defendants based their defense on
the petroleum exclusion, but the plaintiffs contended that the exclusion
was inapplicable because substances other than petroleum leaked from
the tanks. 185 The plaintiffs noted that the defendants' "additive expert"
testified that additives are blended into the company's petroleum prod-
ucts subsequent to the refining process.1 86 The expert further testified
that some of these additives are hazardous substances under CER-
CLA. "'87 Therefore, the plaintiffs contended, because hazardous sub-
stances that are not indigenous to petroleum were added after refining,
1 88
the contamination that resulted was not excluded from CERCLA.189
The court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the petroleum
exclusion might be excepted under the plaintiffs' reasoning if the materi-
als in the storage tank constituted waste oil or waste products, but this
was not such a case.190 Instead, the court held that because the tanks
were used to store unused, refined gasoline and petroleum products, the
defendants were not liable. 91 Thus, the exclusion would not have ap-
183. No. 91-CV-70895-DT, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 1993). The
Zoufal plaintiffs first acquired an interest in the property by lease in 1972, and they continu-
ously operated a gas station on the property from the inception of the lease through the time
the action was filed. Id. at *2. In 1981 the plaintiffs purchased the property. Id. While
removing the underground gasoline storage tanks during a 1989 renovation, they discovered
soil contamination. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs undertook a clean up of the soil at a cost of just
over $52,000 and filed a cause of action under CERCLA for recovery of the cost. Id.
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id. at *6-7.
186. Id. at *8.
187. Id.
188. Refining is defined as "the action or process of removing impurities from a crude or
impure material." WEBSTER'S, supra note 18, at 1908. With petroleum it is the "fractional
distillation usually followed by other processing." Id.
189. Zoufal, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920, at *8.
190. Id. at *10. Generally, waste oil is oil or petroleum that is "not usable for the ordinary
or main purpose of manufacture." WEBSTER'S, supra note 188, at 2580.
191. Zoufal, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920, at *10. Generally, hazardous substances listed
under CERCLA that are mixed with waste oil are found to be excepted from the petroleum
exclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 266 (3d Cir. 1992)
(affirming district court holding that "a plain reading of the 'exclusionary' provision does not
warrant the inclusion of oil which has become contaminated with hazardous substances
through use"); Lockhart Chem. Co. v. Moreco Energy Inc., No. 89-CV-40160-FL, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19,404, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 1992) (holding that hazardous substances in
waste oil do not fall within petroleum exclusion); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp.
973, 981 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (noting that petroleum exclusion does not remove hazardous sub-
stances that are added to or mixed with petroleum from scope of CERCLA coverage), aft'd,
973 F.2d 1296 (1992); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that where contaminants are not indigenous to petroleum or present at elevated
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plied if the defendants had added extraneous chemicals-those not natu-
rally occurring in petroleum or the direct result of refining-to the
gasoline to create a waste product.
192
3. Cose v. Getty Oil Co.
Most recently, the question of what constitutes a "fraction"' 93 was
examined in Cose v. Getty Oil Co. 194 In that case, the plaintiffs brought
an action to recover response costs needed to clean subsurface oil waste
discovered on property they had purchased from the defendant.' 95 The
contamination at issue consisted of crude oil tank bottoms, 196 containing
several hazardous substances including chrysene-a known carcinogen-
in relatively high concentrations. 97  The issue before the court was
whether the crude oil tank bottoms fell within the petroleum exclu-
sion.' 98 To resolve this issue, the court developed a two-part test: (1)
Determine whether the substance is a "fraction" of "petroleum";' 99 and
(2) whether the material was subjected to various refining processes to
produce useful products.2"°
a. is the substance a 'fraction" of 'petroleum"?
As the starting point of its analysis, the court looked to the ordinary
meaning of "fraction" and "petroleum," and relied on the definitions
provided in Wilshire. In Wilshire, "fraction" was defined as "one of sev-
levels, waste oil is included in CERCLA's definition of hazardous substance); Washington v.
Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding that petroleum exclusion
does not apply to contaminants exceeding amounts that naturally occur during refining and
substances not resulting from refining).
192. Zoufal, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920, at *10.
193. See supra note 104.
194. 4 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993).
195. Id. at 702. The plaintiffs purchased property from the defendants, who had an oil
pumping station situated on it. Id. The defendants used the station to transport oil by pipe-
line from its wells to its refinery. Id. A layer of topsoil concealed waste materials dumped on
the property and prevented discovery by reasonable inspection. Id. When the plaintiffs began
to develop the property for housing, the waste material was discovered. Id. at 702-03.
196. Id. at 702. During storage in tanks, sedimentary solids settle out of crude oil and
collect at the bottom of the tanks. Id. Some water is also mixed with crude oil when it is
initially pumped from the ground and, being heavier than oil, this water also settles to the
bottom of the tank. Id. This bottom layer of sediment and water is known as "crude oil tank
bottoms." Id. These tank bottoms are usually drained from crude oil storage facilities and
disposed. The property that the plaintiffs purchased was a facility that defendants used to
drain the tank bottoms. Id.
197. Id. at 703.





eral portions... separable by fractionation and consisting either of mix-
tures or pure chemical compounds."2 ' Fractionation is the process of
separating a chemical compound into its separate components by
processes such as distillation or crystallization. 22 The Wilshire court
found petroleum to be defined as
[ain oily flammable bituminous liquid... that is essentially a
compound mixture of hydrocarbons of different types with
small amounts of other substances ... that is subjected to vari-
ous refining processes (a fractional distillation, cracking, cata-
lytic reforming, hydroforming, alkylation, polymerization) for
producing useful products (as gasoline, naphtha, kerosene, fuel
oils, lubricants, waxes, asphalt, coke, and chemicals) ....
The Cose court noted that crude oil tank bottoms are formed and
accumulate before the oil reaches the refinery. 2" Since these bottoms are
not part of the oil at that point, they are not "'one of several portions
separable by fractionation,' " that the definition of the term fraction re-
quires.20 5 The court also stated that because the tank bottoms are never
subjected to the refining process, and are not used " 'for producing useful
products'" but are "simply discarded waste, ' 20 6 they likewise do not fit
the definition of the term petroleum.20 7 Consequently, the court held
that crude oil tank bottoms fail to satisfy either the definition of fraction
or petroleum, and therefore the petroleum exclusion does not apply.20 8
Essentially, the court's position was that crude oil tank bottoms are
not fractions simply because they never reach the refinery-the bottoms
are simply discarded waste.20 9 This position, however, does not mean
that the tank bottoms can never be "separable by fractionation., 210 The
court failed to specifically address this possibility. Had the court ad-
dressed the issue, the court's reasoning would bring tank bottoms under
the petroleum exclusion's protection as usable petroleum fractions.21'
201. 881 F.2d at 803 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNA-
BRIDGED (1981)).
202. WEBSTER'S. supra note 18, at 900.
203. 881 F.2d at 803.
204. Cose, 4 F.3d at 705.





210. Theoretically, the crude oil tank bottoms could be recycled with waste materials sepa-
rated from petroleum materials capable of being refined, a possibility the court only alludes to
in its opinion. Id. at 706.
211. Id. at 705.
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The court implicitly considers this notion, however, by suggesting that
tank bottoms might be recycled, which could then bring about a different
result.21 2
Thus, it is the treatment of these materials as waste that serves to
justify the court's position. The Cose court viewed these materials as
waste because they had been discarded with no intent to recover or re-
cycle them. 213 Consequently, if these tank bottoms were recovered by
the oil company and recycled for the purpose of subjecting the material
to fractionation, then the tank bottoms would be viewed as a fraction and
the petroleum exclusion could apply. Therefore, the Cose court has cre-
ated a "waste-recyclable" distinction in the analysis of petroleum exclu-
sion cases.
The Cose court compared its decision to that of the court in United
States v. Western Processing Co.,24 which similarly held that "tank bot-
tom sludge is a contaminated waste product, and not a petroleum frac-
tion, as that term is used in [CERCLA]. 215 The Cose court noted that
Western Processing relied heavily on EPA interpretations of the petro-
leum exclusion in arriving at the waste-recyclable product distinction.216
Using the same reasoning, the Cose court determined that the defend-
ant's crude oil tank bottoms should be characterized as waste and there-
fore did not fall within the petroleum exclusion.21 7 By creating this
"waste versus recyclable" distinction,218 the court left open the possibil-
ity that collection of tank bottoms for recycling purposes might bring the
212. Id. at 706.
213. Id.
214. 761 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
215. Id. at 721. The Cose court noted that there is a factual distinction between the facts in
Western Processing and the facts in Cose because the tank bottom material in Western Process-
ing contained sand and rust contaminants which were added separately. Cose, 4 F.3d at 706.
In Cose, the tank bottoms only contained substances that were separated from the stored crude
oil. Id. at 705 n.5. Nevertheless, the court believed that the Western Processing analysis was
relevant. Id.
216. Cose, 4 F.3d at 706. Notably, the Western Processing court mentioned an EPA Final
Rule, published on April 4, 1985, which stated
"[i]f a nondesignated ... substance is spilled and immediately cleaned up for repack-
aging, reprocessing, recycling, or reuse, it is not a waste and the spill need not be
reported....
However, if the substance is not cleaned up for eventual disposal, it is then a
waste (and thus a hazardous substance) which has been released to the environment
and must be reported."
Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 721 (quoting EPA memorandum). Applying the EPA
interpretation, the court in Western Processing held that because the tank bottom material was
being transported for disposal, and not for reuse, it was clearly "waste." Id.




tank bottoms under the protection of the petroleum exclusion. 2 19 Thus,
it appears that the court has provided a means for companies to escape
liability for petroleum waste provided they develop a means of recycling
the waste.
This result is certainly not inconsistent with CERCLA's goal of pro-
viding a means for cleaning up hazardous waste releases. This would
suggest that it is in the best interest of the petroleum industry to develop
a means of recycling waste products, which not only aids the industry in
avoiding liability-so long as the petroleum exclusion remains intact-
but also removes the hazardous material from the environment.
b. has the material been subjected to a refining process, producing a
useful product?
The Cose court also distinguished "useful products" as falling
within the petroleum exclusion. 220 The court found a critical distinction
between "leaded tank bottoms-which consist of waste generated from
cleaning leaded gasoline storage tanks-and crude oil tank bottoms. '"221
Leaded tank bottoms receive greater protection, according to the court,
because "such substances have been 'subjected to various refining
processes' in the production of leaded gasoline. Thus, leaded gasoline is
considered a 'usefulproduct' within the definition of petroleum," and the
petroleum exclusion applies to these materials.222 Crude oil tank bot-
toms, by contrast, are not useful "petroleum" products or "a fraction
thereof" and, as such, do not fall under the protection of the petroleum
exclusion.223
In developing the "useful product" distinction, the Cose court made
an independent policy decision unsupported by either CERCLA's ex-
press language or the legislative record. There is no indication that such
a distinction motivated Congress to adopt the petroleum exclusion.
Moreover, even useful products pose serious risks to health and safety,
and thus should not be immune from CERCLA. For example, toluene is
a useful product, but is nevertheless covered by the statute. The useful
product distinction is another example of the way that the ambiguity of
CERCLA leads to idiosyncratic statutory interpretation.
219. See id. at 706 n.6 (stating that defendant's argument that tank bottoms may be recycl-
able is irrelevant since materials were discarded with no attempt to recycle or reuse).
220. Id. at 708. The court implied that one purpose for the petroleum exclusion was to
protect products that are considered "useful." Id. The assumption is that these products are
useful to society and should not be unduly burdened. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
223. Id.
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c. summary
The analysis in Cose may signal a slight shift in petroleum exclusion
cases by formulating a test to determine whether a product is a fraction
or petroleum under the statute's definition. The first prong of this analy-
sis depends on whether the substance, such as lead, is mixed with crude
oil upon arrival at the refinery, thus becoming a fraction.2 24 The second
prong is to determine whether the material is "subjected to various refin-
ing processes... for producing useful products. ' 225 This prong supports
the finding in Wilshire that the petroleum exclusion covers both leaded
and unleaded gasoline. Even if the substance fails on both prongs, a find-
ing that the material is gathered for recycling in a manner that will ulti-
mately subject the substance to the refining process may preserve the
exclusion's protection.
The judicial interpretation of the petroleum exclusion is still in the
formative stages and it remains to be seen how other circuits will receive
the conclusions of the Ninth Circuit. Based on past experience, however,
most courts follow the Ninth Circuit's decisions very closely in this area.
V. TIME TO ABANDON THE PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
A. The Petroleum Exclusion Increases Litigation Costs and Diverts
Funds That Are Better Spent on Clean Up
CERCLA aims high, but often misses the mark. CERCLA is a top-
heavy system that has largely failed as an expeditious means of attacking
the toxic waste problem. According to many analysts, the primary prob-
lem with CERCLA is that the money allocated for toxic clean-up opera-
tions has been squandered instead on the massive expense of CERCLA
litigation.2 26
224. See supra part IV.C.3.a.
225. See supra part IV.C.3.b.
226. See, e.g., Peter Hong & Michele Galen, The Toxic Mess Called Superfund, Bus. WK.,
May 11, 1992, at 32-33. In criticizing the use of the fund, the writers note that
Superfund has turned into superscandal. After 12 years and $11 billion spent so far,
just 84 of the 1,245 sites on the Superfund high-priority list have been cleaned up....
... ETihe money has been squandered on legal squabbles over who should pay.
A recent RAND Corp. study found that from 1986 to 1989, insurers spent $1.3
billion on Superfund litigation and cleanup-with $1.2 billion of it going to lawyers.
Id. More recently, Time noted the waste of funds on litigation:
[I]n practice the companies sued by the EPA almost always find ways to distribute
the pain, first by suing their own insurance companies, and then by suing any and all
entities involved with the site. Companies readily acknowledge that it is worth
spending millions of dollars on lawyers to put off spending hundreds of millions of
dollars on cleanups.
... About $4 billion of the $20.4 billion spent on Superfund cleanups so far has
been consumed solely by lawyers and filing fees.... And the total cleanup bill-with
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Contributing to the waste of resources on litigation is the inherent
ambiguity in CERCLA's language. This ambiguity tends to invite law-
suits by parties proposing novel statutory interpretations, thereby in-
creasing litigation costs. 227 Because courts must look to sources other
than the statute itself to ascertain congressional intent,228 the litigation
process is lengthened, further adding to the costs.
The time has come to revamp CERCLA to allow the statute to do
what it was originally intended to do-expedite the clean up of hazard-
ous substances with the responsible parties contributing their share of the
costs. To this end, perhaps one of the easiest issues to address is the
petroleum exclusion. Repealing the petroleum exclusion would be a sig-
nificant step toward simplifying the statute, with an attendant reduction
in litigation costs.
B. Factors That Necessitated Compromise in 1980 Are
No Longer at Issue
The possible considerations that may have resulted in the petroleum
exclusion 229 are no longer relevant, and the exclusion can no longer be
justified. In 1980 the petroleum exclusion was necessary for compro-
mise;23 0 but the problem of getting the legislation passed in a timely man-
ner is no longer a consideration. At the time that Congress enacted
CERCLA, the legislation was but a first step in conquering an enormous
problem. 231' Thus, Congress anticipated that fine tuning, or perhaps
wholesale modification, would occur after the statute was enacted. If the
primary concern in 1980 was that the bill would not be passed due to the
congressional session's imminent conclusion,23 2 that is clearly no longer
an issue.
Moreover, emerging issues, such as the serious problem of leaking
underground gasoline storage tanks, strongly suggest the necessity for
hefty litigation costs included-is projected by some to reach $1 trillion over the next
50 years.
Brice Van Voorst, Toxic Dumps: The Lawyers' Money Pit, TIME, Sept. 13, 1993, at 63-64.
227. An example of this is evident in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. California, 790
F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1991), in which the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the addition of
soil that became mixed with refined gasoline brought the product of the two substances out
from under the petroleum exclusion. Id. at 986-87.
228. See Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 805-10 (9th
Cir. 1989) (looking to legislative statements at hearing long after CERCLA's passage as well as
EPA interpretations).
229. See supra part IV.B.
230. See supra part IV.B.1.
231. 126 CONG. REC. 31,975 (1980).
232. See supra part IV.B.1.
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repealing the petroleum exclusion. Although Congress can expect pres-
sure from oil industry interests during any action to revise the statute,
there is no approaching deadline that would lend undue weight to this
pressure, unlike the circumstances that surrounded CERCLA's pas-
sage.23 In addition, the current administration's support of environmen-
tal issues2 4 may lend additional support to such a reform.
C. Equitable Factors Are Not Valid and Are Contrary to CERCLA's
Goals
Regarding the equitable concern that the oil industry is already pay-
ing more than its fair share, the same may be said of the chemical indus-
try-yet that industry receives no exemption. Giving petroleum
products preferential status over other chemical products is inequitable.
For example, the petroleum industry manufactures benzene as a separate
and distinct chemical-a chemical that, in its pure form, is considered to
be a hazardous substance under CERCLA.235 Consequently, if an oil
company accidentally spills benzene, liability for clean up would attach
under CERCLA's provisions. Under those circumstances, the notion
that the oil industry already made a significant contribution does not
shield the oil company from having to pay for clean up.
It is illogical that the petroleum industry's substantial contribution
to the Superfund should be relevant for petroleum spills and not for other
chemical spills since both involve reliance on the same fund to pay clean-
up costs. It is also inconsistent with the underlying rationale for taxing
the oil and chemical industries. The tax burden is placed on those indus-
tries because they have produced many of the substances that find their
way into Superfund sites.2" 6
233. See supra part IV.B.1.
234. The Clinton Administration has attempted to carve out a proenvironment position
since the early days of President Clinton's election campaign. See Peter Hong & Dori J. Yang,
Tree-Huggers vs. Jobs: It's Not That Simple, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1992, at 109. The Adminis-
tration has fostered that image by allowing Vice President Al Gore to establish himself as the
White House's environmental conscience. See Kenneth T. Walsh, A Vice President Who
Counts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 19, 1993, at 29. Positive steps toward environmental
reform by the Clinton Administration include reaching a settlement with the sugar industry to
share clean-up costs for agricultural pollution in southern Florida; a plan to reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels; and a 75% reduction of timber cutting in old-growth for-
ests. See A Game of Greener Than Thou, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1, 1993, at 32.
235. See Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 803 (9th
Cir. 1989) (stating "[i]t is undisputable that benzene ... [is a] hazardous substance[ ], having
been specifically listed or designated pursuant to several of the statutes set forth in Section
9601(14)(A)-(F).").




Furthermore, subsequent funding amendments reduced the propor-
tion of petrochemical industry contributions.2" 7 In the SARA amend-
ments, the fund was increased to nine billion dollars, with less than half
coming from taxes on crude oil and chemical feedstocks, 238 compared
with the 87.5% the petrochemical industry originally contributed.23 9
Even if the equitable concerns were once legitimate, they are no longer
justified in light of the reduction of industry contribution and the new
problems associated with oil and gas pollution.
Similarly, the fear of the impact on the economy, which may have
been a motivating factor in 1980, is no longer an issue. The crisis that
affected the oil industry during the 1970s has abated and prices have
fallen drastically from those earlier levels.2"0 In fact, crude oil prices are
among the lowest in the history of the oil industry and the country has
amassed huge reserves of crude oil.241 Thus, to impose liability for pollu-
tion, with the risk of somewhat increased prices, should not carry the
anticipated dire consequences that confronted Congress in 1980, when
the country's focus was on the energy crisis.
242
Still, to repeal the petroleum exclusion is certain to entail compro-
mise, especially given the troubled economy the oil industry is experienc-
ing.243 While consumers have been enjoying stable prices and reduced
fears of shortages, the companies themselves are experiencing significant
declines in profits and job losses.2 ' 4 The real issue is likely to involve a
balancing of the relative concerns of the economic impact upon the in-
dustry versus the demonstrable, growing health threat and its potential
economic impact.
The equity considerations confronting Congress at the time of CER-
CLA's enactment no longer weigh in favor of the oil industry. The
proper action, therefore, is to remove the petroleum exclusion.
237. See Richard G. Stoll, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-




240. See Michael Parrish, The Oil Crisis: 20 Years Later, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1993, at
D1.
241. Id.
242. See supra part IV.B.2.
243. See Parrish, supra note 240, at D3.
244. Id. The earnings of 300 of the largest oil companies in the United States declined by
37% in 1992, and a half million jobs have been lost in the past decade. Id.
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D. The Overlap with Other Environmental Statutes Provides
Incomplete Protection of the Environment
The hypothesis that the exclusion is the result of CERCLA's over-
lap with other statutes245 also fails to justify the petroleum exclusion.
Because the Clean Water Act only covers spills on navigable waters, 246 it
fails to account for an entire class of oil pollution-those releases that do
not occur on navigable waters and involve disposal or leaks under and
above ground. As discussed, this narrow scope of coverage was probably
due to Congress's unfamiliarity with the broad scope of problems associ-
ated with varying types of oil and petroleum releases.247
New environmental problems resulting from petroleum releases
have become more common in the last few years and are likely to become
exacerbated as more storage vessels decay.248 Congress attempted to ad-
dress these new threats to health and the environment by passing an
amendment to RCRA covering underground storage tanks.249 Unfortu-
nately, RCRA cannot adequately cover the entire problem of leaking
gasoline storage tanks since, to be truly effective, it requires the comple-
ment of CERCLA for environmental enforcement.
CERCLA was intended to operate with RCRA to provide "wrap-
around" coverage for the hazardous waste problem .25  RCRA was
passed in 1976 and established a "cradle-to-grave" program, targeting
present and future hazardous waste activities.25' CERCLA, by contrast,
established a program targeted at regulation of past and present hazard-
ous waste activities.252 Thus, CERCLA and RCRA overlap in the area
of present hazardous waste sites, but CERCLA was designed to correct
the remedial gaps of RCRA by also establishing a means for targeting
abandoned hazardous waste sites.253
Working together, CERCLA and RCRA establish a truly compre-
hensive system for regulating hazardous waste, 254 except in the case of
petroleum and crude oil. For example, there is a gap in the regulation of
245. See supra part IV.B.3.
246. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West Supp. 1993).
247. See supra part IV.B. 1.
248. See Mugdan & Adler, supra note 134, at 515.
249. See supra part IV.B.3.
250. See Stoll, supra note 237, at 75.
251. David R. Case, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 134, at 563, 564.
252. See id.; Stoll, supra note 237, at 93.
253. See King, supra note 19, at 1657.
254. Jonathan M. Peterson, RCRA Enforcement Provisions After the 1984 Amendments, 18
LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 527, 529-30 (1987).
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gasoline storage tanks because the petroleum exclusion exempts leaks as-
sociated with many of these tanks that are not within the reach of
RCRA.255 These include tanks abandoned prior to 1974, or even after
1974 if the owners ceased participating in the petroleum marketing in-
dustry prior to 1986, the year of the amendments. 2- 6 Thus, this group of
individuals would not be subject to RCRA's registration and reporting
requirements; nor would they be subject to CERCLA as long as the pe-
troleum exclusion remains in effect. In these cases the petroleum exclu-
sion contradicts CERCLA's purpose of complementing RCRA and
establishing a comprehensive response mechanism to the problem of haz-
ardous waste.
Because it is in the best interest of public health to ensure that re-
leases of crude oil, petroleum, and fractions thereof are cleaned up
promptly and responsibly, the petroleum exclusion should be deleted
from section 101(14). The solution is relatively simple in theory, but
may be difficult to implement due to the nature of the industry interests
at stake and the political power behind the industry. In addition, the loss
of the petroleum exclusion will bring additional sites within CERCLA's
purview, which will require additional funds. Some sources view this
diversion of funds as a substantial reason not to repeal the petroleum
exclusion.2 7 Although RCRA likely covers a significant portion of the
leaking tanks, the remainder must ultimately be addressed in some man-
ner-either through new legislation or excising the petroleum exclusion.
Enacting new legislation will take time, and deleting the petroleum
exclusion is simply a more efficient means of correcting the problem.
Since funds must be appropriated for the clean up of the increasing
number of petroleum releases, it is more efficient for Congress to author-
ize additional funds under CERCLA to meet the need. The hardship on
CERCLA resources resulting from the loss of the petroleum exclusion
will likely be offset, at least partially, by the savings gained from avoid-
ance of litigation over the exclusion's coverage.
VI. CONCLUSION
The underlying purpose of CERCLA's petroleum exclusion may
never be known because of its sparse legislative history. Whatever that
255. As the Department of Justice and the EPA have noted, the underground storage tank
amendments to RCRA were "intended to fill, in part, the gap in Superfund coverage left by the
petroleum exclusion." See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 143, at 14 (emphasis added).
256. See WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 54, at 184.
257. The problems associated with leaking gasoline storage tanks are enormous. See supra
note 143.
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original purpose may have been, it has outlived its usefulness in light of
emerging environmental problems. The exclusion forecloses clean-up re-
sponses involving oil or petroleum spills at orphaned sites or sites where
the owners and operators have insufficient funds to undertake clean up
themselves; this directly contradicts CERCLA's aims. Furthermore, the
petroleum exclusion is now producing its own body of litigation over the
issue of what constitutes a petroleum "fraction," which means more of
the resources of Superfund will be diverted toward clarifying the statute's
language than to actual clean up. More cases are bound to arise concern-
ing what is included in "crude oil, petroleum, or a fraction thereof," par-
ticularly as technology and the content of petroleum products change.
25 8
Even in the absence of new discoveries of the hazards associated
with petroleum products, the threat to the environment and to human
health is already known to be substantial. Estimates show that citizens
of the United States use approximately 110 billion gallons of gasoline
annually, with nearly all of the product stored underground prior to
use. 59 Because most storage tanks have no protection against corrosion,
there is significant danger of rupture and release of the gasoline into
ground water, thereby posing a long term health threat to those
exposed.2 °
The petroleum exclusion simply creates more needless obstacles to a
practical, effective, and efficient response to these hazards. The petro-
258. See James R. Cox, Comment, Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials in the
Oileld: Changing the Norm, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1197 (1993). That article examines the emerg-
ing health hazards associated with naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) pro-
duced by oilfield hydrocarbons. These elements carry significant health threats to oilfield
workers as well as the general public. Id. at 1197-98. NORM has not been subject to govern-
mental regulation or monitoring. Id. at 1198.
259. See World Health Org., supra note 108, at 175.
260. Id. A number of medical studies have demonstrated several serious health threats due
to exposure to gasoline. Inhalation of gasoline vapors may produce central nervous system
disorders including headache, blurred vision, vertigo, nausea, mental confusion, disorientation,
delirium, and coma. Id. at 181. In addition, there are reported cases of fatal intoxication due
to cerebral edema and hemorrhage. Id. There is also evidence of toxemia during pregnancy as
well as problems with premature births. Id. at 183. Other long-term studies have revealed
increased rates of a variety of cancers in gasoline station workers, fuel oil dealers, and motor
vehicle mechanics. Id. at 184, 192. See generally S. Mommsen & J. Aagard, Occupational
Exposures as Risk Indicator of Male Bladder Carcinoma in a Predominantly Rural Area, 23
ACTA RADIOLOGICA ONCOLOGY 147 (1984) (finding significantly increased risk of bladder
cancer from occupational exposure to oil or gasoline); Otto Wong et al., Critical Review of
Cancer Epidemiology in Petroleum Industry Employees, with a Quantitative Meta-Analysis by
Cancer Site, 15 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 283 (1989) (finding increased risk of leukemia and lym-
phatic tissue cancer in refinery employees); Naohito Yamaguchi et al., Work-Related Bladder
Cancer Risks in Male Japanese Workers, 82 JAPANESE J. CANCER RES. 624 (1991) (finding
significant risk for bladder cancer in petroleum workers).
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leum exclusion forecloses an important remedy for those suffering from
serious potential health consequences resulting from spills of petroleum
substances. It is time for Congress to take proper action to strengthen
and clarify CERCLA. One significant step in this process is the repeal
of the petroleum exclusion.
Roger Armstrong*
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